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What Bergson Should Have Said to Einstein 
1
Let me begin by repeating (changing only the name) a paragraph from a recent paper 
by David Chalmers.

I should say that I am not a historian or a serious scholar of Bergson. 
These are merely some speculative remarks not well-grounded in scholarly 
attention to Bergson’s texts. But I think the speculative question is 
interesting. I’m going to sketch one speculative answer. I’m going to be 
interested to hear from people who know much more about Bergson than I 
do about whether this speculation has any remote plausibility. If the 
historical speculation has none, as may well be possible, I think there is still 
a very interesting philosophical project in the neighborhood which is itself 
worthy of attention. 
2
My speculative remarks concern the famous debate between Henri Bergson and 
Albert Einstein that took place in Paris on 6 April 1922. This encounter has recently 
received a book-length treatment,  but little of the substance of the debate was 3
actually reported in it. Einstein and Bergson disagreed, unsurprisingly, as to whether 
time is better understood through scientific or philosophical examination.  But in regard 4
specifically to Bergson’s views concerning time in the special theory of relativity, we 
 This paper was delivered at the Reasssessing Bergson conference held in Cambridge, England on 1
11-12 September 2019. I am grateful to the co-organizers of the conference (Theo Borgvin-Weiss, 
Florian Fischer, Sam Sokolsky-Tifft, and Zoe Wallker) for inviting me to this meeting. The conference 
proceedings are intended to be published as the contents of issue 1 of a new journal, Bergsoniana, 
sponsored by the  Société des amis de Bergson. While my paper has been in press, it has come to my 
attention (4 June 2020) that a second paper arguing that Bergson should have embraced local passage 
in relativistic spacetimes, “What Bergson should have said about special relativity” by Peter Kügler, was 
published in Synthese (May, 2020). It was received by that journal 11 December 2019.
 See “Carnap’s Second Aufbau and David Lewis’s Aufbau” by David Chalmers at philarchive.org. In this 2
tour de force Chalmers speculates on the nature of a book that Carnap indicated that he intended to 
write but never did write—a physicalist version of his (phenomenalist) Aufbau—and the nature of a book 
by David Lewis that Lewis did not even indicate an intention to write.
 The Physicist and the Philosopher by Jimena Canales (Princetion University Press, 2015). I will refer to 3
this book below as P&P.
 Indeed, Canales cites this debate as one of the sources of the increasing gulf between scientific and 4
humanistic treatments of time in the 20th century.
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have the evidence of a book he wrote on that topic at the time of the debate, Duration 
and Simultaneity.  My remarks in this paper primarily concern claims of Bergson in that 5
book, claims that deal specifically with time in STR (the Special Theory of Relativity), 
and I will leave it to others, should they wish, to tease out their implications for some of 
Bergson’s more general theses concerning time.

STR is well-known for showing that certain quantities or relations (length, mass, 
simultaneity) that were regarded as frame-invariant or absolute in pre-relativistic 
physics are actually frame-dependent or relative. One standard and striking illustration 
of these novel and unintuitive ideas is the so-called “twin paradox.”  One way of 6
presenting the “paradox” is to imagine a pair of identical twins. One travels to a distant 
galaxy on a rocket ship at very high speed and then returns to earth at the same high 
speed. The other remains on earth. STR implies that the travelling twin on their return 
will have aged less than the stay-at-home twin.

Bergson did not accept this conclusion. In fact, he argued that

(1) The clock paradox is false. The sort of behaviour described in the clock paradox 
will not in fact occur using clocks in our world.

(2) The clock paradox results from a misunderstanding of STR. Therefore one can 
deny that the behavior described in the clock paradox would actually occur while 
accepting all of STR (that is, all the valid mathematical/physical core of STR) itself.

I think that any fair-minded reader of D&S will agree that Bergson argued for (1) and 
(2) above. Let me give just one bit of textual evidence (from the third Appendix to the 
second edition) that supports both claims.

 Duration and Simultaneity (first published in French in 1922 as Durée et Simultanéité). A second edition 5
was published in 1923 with three important appendices added. The English version that I use here was 
published by The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. in The Library of Liberal Arts (1965). The translator is 
Leon Jacobson. I will refer to this book below as D&S.
 I prefer to refer to it by the more generic term the clock paradox. Of course, it is not a paradox at all; it 6
is just one of the many counter-intuitive implications of STR. For an illuminating, at-the-time-
comprehensive discussion of failed responses to the clock paradox see Time and the Space Traveller by 
L. Marder (University of Pennsylvania Pres, 1971). For a sophisticated modern philosophical account of 
the “paradox” see chapters 5 and 6 of Richard Arthur’s The Reality of Time Flow (Springer, 2019).
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In short, there is nothing to change in the mathematical expression of the 
theory of relativity. But physics would render a service to philosophy by 
giving up certain ways of speaking which lead the philosopher into error, and 
which risk fooling the physicist himself regarding the metaphysical 
implications of his views. For example, we are told above that “if two 
identical, synchronized clocks are at the same spot in the system of 
reference, if we shift one very  rapidly and then bring it back again next to 
the other at the end of time t (the time of the system), it will lag behind the 
other by t - .”  In reality, we should say that the moving clock exhibits 
this slowing at the precise instant at which it touches, still moving, the 
motionless system and is about to re-enter it. But immediately upon re-
entering, it points to the same time as the other…. (D&S,185)

Unfortunately, claims (1) and (2) are incorrect. In 1971 an experiment was done that 
directly tested the clock “paradox”. It was reported in a two-part paper. I will simply 
quote the abstracts to the two parts.

During October 1971, four cesium beam atomic clocks were flown on 
regularly scheduled commercial jet flights around the world twice, once 
eastward and once westward, to test Einstein's theory of relativity with 
macroscopic clocks. From the actual flight paths of each trip, the theory 
predicts that the flying clocks, compared with reference clocks at the U.S. 
Naval Observatory, should have lost 40 ± 23 nanoseconds during the 
eastward trip, and should have gained 275 ± 21 nanoseconds during the 
westward trip. The observed time differences are presented in the report that 
follows this one.  
7
Four cesium beam clocks flown around the world on commercial jet flights 
during October 1971, once eastward and once westward, recorded 
directionally dependent time differences which are in good agreement with 
predictions of conventional relativity theory. Relative to the atomic time scale 
of the U.S. Naval Observatory, the flying clocks lost 59 ± 10 nanoseconds 
adt0
t
∫
 Hafele, J. C. and R. Keating, “Around-the-World Atomic Clocks: Predicted Relativistic Time Gains,” 7
Science, New Series 177 No. 4044, 14 July 1972: 166-168.
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during the eastward trip and gained 273 ± 7 nanoseconds during the 
westward trip, where the errors are the corresponding standard deviations. 
These results provide an unambiguous empirical resolution of the famous 
clock "paradox" with macroscopic clocks. 
8
So thesis (1) above is false. As for (2), it is important to see not just that it is false, but 
also how central it is to STR that it is false. To that end, let me show you two 
illustrations from a remarkable popular book about relativity, Robert Geroch’s General 
Relativity from A to B. First, we will look at Figure 34 on page 75 of that book. 
9


 Hafele, J. C. and R. Keating, “Around-the-World Atomic Clocks: Observed Relativistic Time Gains,” 8
Science, New Series 177 No. 4044, 14 July 1972:168-170
 The University of Chicago Press, 1978.9
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Then we turn to Fig. 35:

Event q is just an arbitrarily chosen point in spacetime. So therefore any event in 
spacetime (if we answer yes to the question posed by Geroch) can be assigned a 
unique time, once we assign t=0 to p. And therefore we can collect all events assigned 
the same time into surfaces, thus obtaining the “universal time” that Geroch mentions. 
The resulting spacetime structure is what Geroch calls Galilean spacetime. It is the 
spacetime perhaps best adapted to be the setting of Newton’s mechanics, but it has 
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too much structure (the unique same-time surfaces) to be Minkowski spacetime, the 
spacetime of STR. A yes answer to Geroch’s question is inconsistent with STR. 
10
So we must respond to Geroch’s question with no (in STR). A convenient way to 
express this response is to say that in STR time is path-dependent. The path-
dependence of time is, then, central to STR. The clock paradox is merely one specific 
manifestation of the path-dependence of time.

According to Canales, Bergson paid dearly for this mistake. He enjoyed rock-star 
celebrity in 1922 but died in obscurity. 

By the time Bergson died on January 3, 1941, the event was particularly 
shocking because the world had already fallen into the habit of thinking of him as 
dead. His debate with Einstein precipitated the vertiginous downward fall. (P&P, 
31)

What I wish to say here, tentatively, is that it need not have been so. Bergson did not 
play his philosophical hand as well as he could have in the debate with Einstein (and in 
Duration and Simultaneity). It might well have been better for him personally and for the 
course of philosophy in the twentieth century if he had. I will now try to make this case, 
but I would like to lay it out in a slightly round-about manner.

First, I think that any fair-minded reader of D&S would have to conclude that Bergson 
made a serious and sustained effort to understand STR. The theory was accepted by 
the community of theoretical or mathematical physicists surprising rapidly, but it was 
nevertheless a complex and counter-intuitive theory that still has the power to startle 
anyone who studies it. In the century since its advent, its central ideas have been 
clearly distinguished and the arguments for or derivations of the odd relativistic effects 
 Milič Čapek in Bergson and Modern Physics: A Reinterpretation and Re-evaluation (Reidel, 1971) 10
claims that “Bergson was right as long as we remain within the framework of the special theory of 
relativity.” (p. 246) The common mistake that the general theory of relativity is required to remove the 
apparent paradoxical nature of the clock “paradox” is effectively dealt with in the book by Marder 
referred to above. 
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have been simplified and polished.  It’s much easier for us now to see what is 11
essential to STR than it would have been for Bergson then. 

It is not shocking, then, that he took an essential idea of STR for an optional 
philosophical gloss. He doubtless had salient reasons for (erroneously) convincing 
himself of this view; but I also think that he had sufficient respect for experiment to 
believe that, had it been possible to do an experiment like the Hafele and Keating 
experiment in, say, 1920, he would have accepted the result. Two real clocks make 
round-the-world trips in each direction. Neither of them is imaginary. I do not know 
what exactly led Bergson to reject the twin thought-experiment, to reject that idea (as I 
would like to put it now) that there could be real time along two trajectories in 
(Minkowski) spacetime between a pair of events like p and q in Figure 34 above, even 
though the times measured along the world lines were not the same. (That is, even 
though TA(q) - TA(p)  TB(q) - TB(p).) But I do think—or at least I would like to conjecture
—that had he seen the evidence against (1) above, he would have changed his mind. 

By the 1970s the state of knowledge had changed considerably from that of 1923. 
The question to ponder is not, I submit, whether Bergson would have changed his 
mind about the clock paradox, but how would he have have changed it? I will hazard 
one conjecture, but I am aware that many others are possible.

 Consider the aphorism that appears on page 65 of D&S: “[T]ime is succession.” Let 
us ask ourselves what Bergson could say if he had been asked (or had asked himself): 
a succession of what? Most philosophers of time—and probably most non-
philosophers as well—would after some thought suppose that time is a succession of 
sets or collections of  simultaneous instantaneous events spanning the universe. (There 
might be some hesitation as to whether the events are instantaneous or have some 
small duration, but that choice makes no difference to my story in this paper.) These 
≠
 For an elegant popular introduction to all the standard STR phenomena, see N. David Mermin’s Space 11
and Time in Special Relativity (Waveland Press, 1968). Mermin discusses the clock paradox on pages 
187-194 in a version involving three inertial observers (and so no acceleration). It is remarkably 
instructive to calculate in detail the example from the perspective of each of the three clocks or 
“observers”.
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sets of events occur one after another. That is, they occur successively. This 
succession is the unfolding or happening or history of the universe. 
12
This answer would not be available to Bergson. A global or universe-wide set of 
simultaneous events is what he would call—if I understand him correctly—a snapshot 
of the universe. The idea that time is the succession of such snapshots is precisely the 
cinematographic conception of time that he castigated in Creative Evolution. He might, 
of course, reconsider that old view of his, but a reconsideration in light of STR makes it 
less, rather than more, plausible. In STR, at any given spatio-temporal location there is 
no special (or “metaphysically privileged” ) snapshot. There are only an infinite number 13
of equally non-special snapshots. This multiplicity does not provide an attractive 
foundation on which to build a metaphysics of time.

I believe there is a better choice for Bergson. Consider the two paths followed by two 
clocks connecting events p and q in figures 34 and 35. Each path is a set of events 
that occur successively. Each path could be the path of a space traveller.  Instead of 14
trying to confine real or lived time to just one such path,  allow real or lived time, at 15
least potentially, along each path. Embracing the twins rather than rejecting them is 
surely a step in the right direction, a recognition of what STR says and the weight of 
evidence in its favour. 

But of course this step raises new questions. What of triplets? There is no reason to 
stop at two, it seems. Each of their three paths in spacetime would be sets of events 
that occur successively. To put this point another way, suppose there were three 
distinct timelike curves connecting  points p and q in Geroch’s figures. Then there 
would be in general three distinct (proper) times along each such world line, each 
potentially equally “real” or lived or genuine. But once this line of thought is started, 
 Bergson speaks of “the singleness of an impersonal time. Such is the hypothesis of common 12
sense.” (D&S, 47) He goes on to imply that Einstein supports this hypothesis.
 A notion that is often invoked but rarely explained.13
 Allowing for the fact that, if the space traveller is human, some paths have accelerations that humans 14
cannot survive.
 “The real is that which is measured by a real physicist, and the imaginary, that which is represented in 15
the mind of the real physicist as measured by imaginary physicists.” (D&S, 79)
Page 8
What Bergson Should Have Said to Einstein Draft (June, 2020)
one should see that there is no natural finite end to it. There is no non-arbitrary upper 
bound on the number of timelike curves connecting p and q (or any other pair of points 
in spacetime) with associated proper times.

Why not, then, trade the constricted or anemic conception of lived time that we find 
in D&S (lived time on one timelike curve, ghostly time on the others) for a robust 
conception of genuine time flourishing equally on all timelike world lines?  Of course, 16
this need not presuppose or entail that all timelike worldlines are the paths in 
spacetime of conscious “observers” or clocks. It would entail or presuppose that all 
such worldlines are potentially the paths of such “observers” or clocks. On this view, 
Minkowski spacetime would teem with times. 
17
I have to say ‘times’ because, as noted above, time is path dependent and there is a 
non-denumerable infinity of paths connecting any two timelike separated points like p 
and q in the two figures above. Although this plurality of times may seem 
philosophically puzzling, any account of time (or at least any that I am acquainted with) 
brings some philosophical puzzles in its train. But there is also a great philosophical 
advantage as well. This point of view is a necessary corrective to the mistake, often 
made by physicists as well as philosophers and historians,  that the spacetime of STR 18
is somehow “static” or a “block universe.” Here, for instance, is the opinion of one 
eminent philosopher, Sir Karl Popper:

And a deterministic system such as the field theory of Einstein might even 
be described as a four-dimensional version of Parmenides' unchanging 
three-dimensional universe. For in a sense no change occurs in Einstein's 
four-dimensional block-universe. Everything is there just as it is, in its four-
dimensional locus; change becomes a kind of 'apparent' change; it is 'only' 
the observer who as it were glides along his world-line and becomes 
 This picture is fleshed out and defended in “Neither Presentism nor Eternalism” by the physicist Carlo 16
Rovelli, in Foundations of Physics 49 (2019): 1325-1335. 
 And Bergson did write “We believe that a philosophy in which duration is considered real and even 17
active can quite readily admit Minkowski's and Einstein's space-time…” (D&S, 63) 
 Canales writes that “Einstein’s theory… on its own… describes a universe where our sense of time 18
passing by us was an illusion.” (P&P, 275)
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successively conscious of the different loci along this world-line; that is, of 
his spatio-temporal surroundings . . .  
19
This sort of (confused, I suggest) idea is no doubt one that lies behind (or beneath) 
disputes about time that continue to this day. As Canales says, near the end of her 
book, 

As the [20th] century drew to a close, the “time of the universe” and “lived 
time” appeared as irreconcilable as science and philosophy in ways that 
exceeded the discussion that took place that day. (P&P, 348)

But this source of division (and confustion) could have been scotched by Bergson. 
Had Bergson accepted the result of the clock paradox, he could have correctly pointed 
out to Einstein that Minkowski spacetime, far from being a static or  so-called “block 
universe”, is chock-a-block (as it were) with temporal dynamism.  For all I know, by 20
the way, he could have been the first to point this out, thus gaining (from my point of 
view at least) a far more significant place in the history of philosophy and physics of 
time than he has today.

Students of Bergson may suspect that he could not have changed his views 
regarding STR in the way I have suggested without altering other, very fundamental 
views, as well. They may be right. My reflections above concern the behaviour of 
clocks—more specifically, the behaviour of ideal clocks on timelike world lines. For 
Bergson, such behaviour is only indirectly indicative of anything at all about time itself. 
Here’s a typical remark in this vein:

It is therefore the simultaneity between two instants of two motions outside 
of us that enables us to measure time; but it is the simultaneity of these 
 Conjectures and Refutations (Basic Books, New York and London, 1962), p. 80.19
 Čapek writes that Bergson “failed to see that the relativistic space-time, correctly interpreted, far from 20
implying the elimination of becoming, reintroduces it into the physical world.” (Bergson and Modern 
Physics, 252)  Either Bergson failed to see this correct interpretation, or he thought that it had 
philosophical costs that he was reluctant to pay, as I suggest below.
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moments with moments pricked by them along our inner duration that 
makes this measurement one of time. (D&S, 54)

The root idea here is, I believe, that time, real time, is accessible to our 
consciousness whereas the quantity measured by clocks is some sort of derivative 
quantity or secondary shadow of genuine duration. I think this view is deeply mistaken, 
but it will not be possible to argue that point in any detail within the confines of this 
talk. The best I can do in this short compass, I think, is to quote a perceptive statement 
of a view more like the one I favour by Ernst Cassirer:

For Newton it was certain that the absolute and mathematical time, which 
by its nature flowed uniformly, was the "true" time of which all empirically 
given temporal determination can offer us only a more or less imperfect 
copy; for Bergson, this "true" time of Newton is a conceptual fiction and 
abstraction, a barrier, which intervenes between our apprehension and the 
original meaning and import of reality. But it is forgotten that what is here 
called absolute reality, duree reelle, is itself no absolute but only signifies a 
standpoint of consciousness opposed to that of mathematics and physics. 
In the one case, we seek to gain a unitary and exact measure for all 
objective process, in the other we are concerned in retaining this process 
itself in its pure qualitative character, in its concrete fullness and subjective 
inwardness and "contentuality." The two standpoints can be understood in 
their meaning and necessity; neither suffices to include the actual whole of 
being in the idealistic sense of "being for us." The symbols that the 
mathematician and physicist take as a basis in their view of the outer and 
the psychologist in his view of the inner, must both be understood as 
symbols. Until this has come about the true philosophical view, the view of 
the whole, is not reached, but a partial experience is hypostasized into the 
whole.  
21
A recurring theme in Canales’s book is that the disagreement between Bergson and 
Einstein regarding time is one of the sources of the twentieth-century rift between 
continental and analytic (or humanistic and science/logic inspired) philosophical 
 This quote appears on pages 454-455 of the Supplement to Cassirer’s Substance and Function,  21
“Einstein’s Theory of Relativity considered from the Epistemological Standpoint,” which first appeared in 
German in 1921. I quote from the English  translation by William C. Swabey and Marie C. Swabey, which 
was first published by the Open Court Publishing Co. in 1923 and which was reprinted by Dover 
Publications in 1953.
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schools. I am not enough of a historian to have an informed opinion on this matter.  22
But insofar as she is correct, then I suggest that that source of the rift was spurious. 
Bergson could have replaced his tortured denials of the clock paradox with a 
recognition that succession along timelike worldlines is dynamic and, at least 
potentially, lived. I contend that neither humanists nor scientists need dissent.

Čapek ends his chapter on Bergson and Einstein by noting that “it is clear that to 
separate what is living from what is dead in Bergson’s interpretation of relativity theory 
is a complex task.” My minimal hope is to convince the reader at least that Bergson’s 
denial of the clock paradox is a dead element of his thought.  My maximal hope is that 
reflection upon the clock paradox and STR will lead those who are sympathetic to 
Bergson’s ideas to look more sceptically on his privileging one side of a deeply 
complex phenomenon (time only as psychological time) to a balanced appreciation of 
the whole (time as experienced and the same time as measured by clocks). 

Steven F. Savitt

savitt01@gmail.com

November, 2019

 For a different, but possibly complementary, account, see Michael Friedman’s A Parting of the Ways 22
(Open Court, 2000).
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